




Logistics Architecture Objective

- ➤ Design and guide the implementation of a logistics system that inherently meets the operational requirements of Joint Vision 2010
 - Required performance levels
 - Functional process
 - Capital infrastructure
 - Organizational / force structure
 - Industrial base
 - Information systems
- > Focus on joint warfighter needs and DOD national level strategy



Integration of C4ISR Architectures





Core Issues That the Logistics Architecture Must Address

- Multiple players in deployment and sustainment chain: Services, DLA, TRANSCOM, Supporting CINCs, GSA
 - SourcingTransport
 - DistributionIntegration
- Deployment and sustainment flow into theater not coordinated or synchronized
- > No effective method to quickly influence the operational or logistics warfighting flow
- Numerous players competing for scarce assets; no effective method to implement CINC's logistics priorities
- ➤ Lack of logistics situational awareness
- > Numerous disparate business rules that influence the conduct of the mission, but are not supportive of the mission (e.g., financial and Service)
- > Legacy equipment is difficult to move and requires large levels of sustainment



Force Capability Variables

Customer (Warfighter) Relevance = Force Capability (FC)

FC = (Requirements) X (Distance) X (Efficiency) (Capabilities)

Requirement:

- Lighter Equipment
- Less Equipment
- Less Sustainment

Capabilities:

- Add Lift
- Add Prepositioning
- Add Forward Stationing
- Improved Info Management

Distance:

- Early Movement before C-Day
- Add Prepositioning
- Add Forward Stationing

Efficiency:

- Velocity Management
- Reduced Footprint
- Focused Logistics



Major 2010 Fundamental Assumptions



- Customer is the Warfighting CINC
- > Logistics performance required under all conditions
- > Architecture will support full spectrum operations
- Architecture will drive necessary modifications to information and communications systems
- > Reserve forces will be required (from volunteer activation through Presidential Reserve Call-up [PRC])
- Focus on managing information and suppliers vice managing stock
- > 2007 DPG force levels remain constant




Significant Capability Gaps

- > DOD does not operate in peace as in war
- > Inability to fully support warfighter with focused (what is needed now) logistics
- > Saturation of strategic and tactical lift for deployment and sustainment
- > Lack of capability to fully integrate deployment and sustainment
- > Inadequate infrastructure to support full spectrum operations
- > Availability of highly reliable, pervasive, and protected communications and information systems
- ➤ Lack of interoperable information management systems providing situational awareness and real-time management capability
- > Inability to deliver anywhere based on a time-definite delivery schedule
- Complexity of current funding procedures focuses warfighter attention away from warfight



DOD Support Chain



National asset managers (NAM) and integrators, working in <u>coalition</u> with a <u>primary transportation agent</u>, manage deployment and sustainment requirements